social insurance

Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and the Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits
We develop a novel way of identifying the liquidity and moral hazard effects of unemployment insurance exclusively from how job-finding …
Rodolfo G. Campos, J. Ignacio García-Pérez, Iliana Reggio
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Do the unemployed pay lower prices? A reassessment of the value of unemployment insurance
It is well known that transitions from employment to unemployment reduce consumption expenditure, but is this fall mainly driven by …
Rodolfo G. Campos, Iliana Reggio
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Optimal unemployment insurance: Consumption versus expenditure
We study the optimal provision of unemployment insurance (UI) in a framework that distinguishes between consumption and expenditure. We …
Rodolfo G. Campos, Iliana Reggio
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